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CASE NOTES
REAL PROPERTY-BUSINESS COMPULSION: EXACTION
OF OVERPAYMENT
Plaintiff was having part of his land appropriated for an expressway
project by the City of Columbus. It was imperative, therefore, that he
find other land so that he could relocate that part of his manufacturing
plant which was then on the appropriated land. Owning some land im-
mediately west of the present site, he planned to relocate there. The de-
fendant owned a small parcel of land which was contiguous with this
land. Desiring to obtain this small plot so that he could start relocating,
he entered into a contract of sale with defendant which provided that
defendant would deliver "merchantable title in fee simple," conveyance by
"deed of general warranty with release of dower." In return, plaintiff was
to pay $8,000 for the land. Plaintiff had considerable trouble obtaining a
clear title from the defendant and subsequently commenced an action for
specific performance. Defendant then disclosed that he was married and
would not deliver a title free from dower right unless plaintiff paid an
additional $7,000. Realizing that he could not get release of dower through
his action for specific performance, as defendant's wife was not a party
to the contract of sale, plaintiff paid the additional amount, since he ur-
gently needed the land in order to relocate. Plaintiff immediately started
this action for recovery of the $7,000 overcharge plus $10,000 in damages
for late performance on the contract. To this action, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, sustained a general demurrer. Plain-
tiff appealed to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, and the court affirmed the
lower court's decision, holding that the plaintiff paid the additional
amount voluntarily and that he was not compelled to pay as he had an
action for specific performance. Weinman Pump Manufacturing Co. v.
B. F. Cline, 183 N.E.2d 465 (Court of Appeals of Ohio, 1961). 1
The important question which this case poses involves the doctrine of
business compulsion, on which the plaintiff relies for restitution of the
$7,000 overcharge. A divided court held that not only was the doctrine
not recognized in Ohio, but that if it were, it would not apply to this case.
At earliest common law, duress was only considered to be duress of
person, which involves the exaction of illegal payment by threat of physi-
cal violence to the person.2 This doctrine gradually was extended to cover
situations of duress of goods, i.e., the seizure or detention of personal
I Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio on a motion to direct the Court of
Appeals to certify its record. The motion was denied. No records are kept on these
motions.
2 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131. For a good discussion of this topic, see Galusha
v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N.W. 495. <
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property to extort payment from the owner.3 Subsequently the business
compulsion doctrine developed from common law duress. It has been
defined thus:
... while differing somewhat from the common law duress [it] is a species of
duress involving involuntary action, in which one is compelled to act against
his will in such a manner that he suffers a serious business loss or is compelled
to make a monetary payment to his detriment.4
Although the doctrine of business compulsion is almost universally rec-
ognized in this country, the cases involving it have varied results. Cases
affirming the doctrine are in a slight majority.5 The reason for the varied
results is that, "it is manifestly impossible ... to frame a test to determine
precisely what the nature or extent of the injury or interference must be
in order to constitute duress. Each case must be judged in the light of its
peculiar circumstances."
A question which is relevant in almost all the decisions based on the
doctrine is what constitutes voluntary or involuntary action. The reason
for this is that a person who performs a voluntary action cannot be said
to have done it under compulsion. Although this is a question of fact,
there must be some sort of objective standard upon which a decision can
be made. Necessarily then, "an involuntary payment imports a payment
made against the will of the person who pays. It implies that there is some
fact or circumstance which overcomes the will and imposes a necessity
of payment in order to escape further ills." 7 Therefore, "to constitute a
voluntary payment the party paying must have had the freedom of exer-
cising his will. When he acts under any species of compulsion the payment
is not voluntary."
For a better understanding of the factual situations which will cause the
doctrine to be applied, an examination of some clear cases must be made.
In Van Dyke v. Wood the husband (plaintiff) conveyed to his wife (de-
3 Foshay v. Ferguson, 16 N.Y.C.L. 154 (1843). For a good discussion, see: Van Dyke
v. Wood, 60 App. Div. 208, 70 N.Y.S. 324 (1901).
4 Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 598, 89 P. 2d 513, 515 (1939). Also see 5 WILLIsToN,
CONTRACTS S 1618 (rev. ed., 1937).
5 Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P. 2d 12 (1959); Gilmore v. Texas Co., 100
Fla. 169, 129 So. 587 (1930); Jones v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 150 Md. 24, 132 Ad. 278
(1926); Dale v. Simon, 267 S.W. 467 (Commission of Appeals of Texas, 1924); Home-
crest Bldg. Co. v. Weinstein's Estate, 165 N.Y.S. 176 (1917); Kilpatrick v. Germania
Life Ins. Co., 183 N.Y. 163, 75 N.E. 1124 (1905); Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52
N.W. 217 (1892). For a further discussion, see Annot., 79 A.L.R. 655 (1932).
6 WOODWARD, Til LAW OF QUASI CONTRATS § 218(5), p. 346 (1913).
7Tripler v. Mayor of New York, 125 N.Y. 617, 625, 26 N.E. 721, 723 (1891).
8 Scholey v. Mumford, 60 N.Y. 498, 501 (Supreme Court of N.Y., 1875).
) 60 App. Div. 208, 70 N.Y.S. 324 (1901).
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fendant) more land than she had in her inchoate right of dower in all his
lands. In return she promised to release her dower rights in any of his
lands upon request. There was a judgment of foreclosure on some of his
lands, and since he had no funds, he requested her release of dower on
some of his other lands in order that he could sell them and raise funds
for payment of the mortgage. She refused to comply with the request un-
less he conveyed more of his land to her. He was forced to give in to her
demand as foreclosure was sure to follow. He then sued to have the deeds,
issued to his wife, voided, as he issued them under duress. The court held
for the plaintiff, stating that although it may have been possible for the
husband to have obtained release of dower through specific performance,
the sale upon foreclosure would have taken place and made the release
unnecessary. In Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co.,'0 plaintiff contracted to
lease a gasoline station. The lease gave plaintiff an option to buy the land
and provided that during the term of the lease plaintiff should handle
products of the defendant exclusively. A sales contract was entered into
whereby plaintiff received a discount on the gasoline. When the time
came for the delivery of the gasoline, plaintiff was not granted the dis-
count. He protested but paid for the delivery and paid for several deliv-
eries thereafter. In a suit to recover the amount of the discount, a divided
court held that the rule was that where money, illegally exacted, is paid
to prevent the sacrifice of capital, under business compulsion, it may be
recovered if paid under protest. The dissent stated that the payments were
voluntary, that the plaintiff had a remedy in the courts, and that he de-
layed too long in bringing action. In a land case, the purchaser of land
relying on a contract of purchase with the defendant had sold the houses
on the purchased land. Time being of the greatest importance in view of
the purchaser's commitment, he was forced to pay more money by the
vendor in order to secure the deed to the land. The court held that the
payment was made under duress and the purchaser could recover."
In the many cases denying recovery, the courts do not refuse to accept
the doctrine itself, but find, rather, that the factual situations do not con-
form to the doctrine.'2 In New Jersey Brick Co. v. A. M. Krantz Co.,"3
plaintiff sold defendant a quantity of brick at $7.00 per 1,000. Before de-
liveries were completed, plaintiff raised the price to $7.50. Defendant
10 173 Wash. 672, 24 P.2d 82 (1933).
11 Smelo v. Girard Trust Co., 158 Pa. Super. 473, 45 A. 2d 264 (1946).
12 Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P. 2d 513 (1939); McCormick v. Dalton, 53 Kan.
146, 35 Pac. 1113 (1894); Cable v. Foley, 45 Minn. 421, 47 N.W. 1135 (1891); Hackley
v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 511 (1881).
1394 N.J.L. 255, 109 Ad. 350 (1920).
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objected but continued buying the brick. Plaintiff sued defendant on a
small claim, and defendant counterclaimed duress on this overcharge. The
court held that payment was voluntary, for the defendant was perfectly
free to pay or not, and, if he did not pay, to defend on the ground that
the plaintiff was entitled to only the original price. He chose not to do so.
In Boss v. Hutchinson,14 plaintiff contracted to buy potatoes from de-
fendant at 93 cents per bushel. The potatoes were in a railroad car and in
danger of spoiling. Defendant stated that the price was $1.93 per bushel
and not 93 cents. Plaintiff claimed that he had to pay the extra money
under duress. The court held for the defendant, stating that:
[T]he instant case is merely one where a seller refuses to deliver the goods at
the agreed price, and demands a higher price. The purchaser has a complete and
adequate remedy at law. He can recover his damages for the breach of the
contract: ... In this case he elected to pay the increased price. Having done
so, his payment was voluntary.... That he paid under protest does not make
the payment involuntary .... [n]or in the instant case were any facts alleged
or proved which would tend to show that the legal remedy afforded would not
be adequate. 15
Detroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co.10 involves an allegedly duressed
overpayment for coal. Plaintiff alleged that he had to give heat and cur-
rent to the City of Detroit and that he had to submit to defendant's de-
mands for more money. The court held that, "the law affords relief only
in cases of payments illegally and improperly exacted, or coerced under
duress or compulsion .... [Tlhere must exist such conditions as to con-
stitute a sure-enough emergency, making it necessary to submit to the
unreasonable and unjust demand imposed .. .. "IT The court found that
the facts did not present such a situation and that "no necessity within the
contemplation of the law is averred why such exaction should have been
assented to."
In the cases previously discussed, there has been the question of alter-
native remedies. In many cases it has been held that if the party under
duress has a remedy at law or in equity, and decides to pay a coerced
overcharge instead of relying on the courts, he will be denied restitution
of the overcharge.'8 The opposing view is that where a threat of serious
financial loss will occur and the remedy allowed will not be adequate, 19
14 182 App. Div. 88, 169 N.Y.S. 513 (1918).
15 Id. at 90-1, 169 N.Y.S. at 515-6.
16 293 Fed. 489 (4th Cir., 1923). 17 Id. at 493.
18 5 WILLISrON, CONTRACTS § 1620 (rev. ed. 1937).
19 A loss which will occur from the delay in invoking the remedy cannot be called
an adcquatc remedy in these cases.
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the person at whom the threat is aimed has no realistic alternative but to
pay the overcharge.20 This seems to be the more logical approach.
Illinois has many cases involving the doctrine.21 Most of these affirm it,
and it is the law, today. The Illinois view is best stated in Pittsburgh Steel
Co. v. Hollingshead and Blei22 where the Appellate Court held it to be:
a well settled rule of law that where one is compelled to pay money to another,
who has no legal right to demand it, in order to prevent injury to his person,
business or property, such payment is, in law, made under duress, and may be
recovered back from the party receiving it, and it makes no difference that the
payment was made with full knowledge.238
In the Weinman case, the court held that plaintiff obtained more by
paying than he could have by proceeding with his action for specific per-
formance because he could not obtain release of dower. According to the
court's reasoning, he, therefore, paid voluntarily and obtained more by
receiving the wife's release of dower since she was not a party to the
original contract. It must be remembered, however, that plaintiff was to
receive release of dower in the original contract. Thus the payment of the
$7,000 was legally without consideration. In the words of Judge Duffey,
who dissented, the plaintiff was in the same situation as "a purchaser who
is faced with an unlawful refusal to perform unless an unlawful demand
is satisfied; who faces a substantial direct financial loss and an immeasura-
ble indirect loss as a result of a shutdown of production."2 4
Judge Duffey shows the inequity of the decision:
We cannot ignore the fact that the law is an imperfect instrument. Legal rights
exist for which, under particular circumstances, our remedies can provide only
partial and incomplete protection. The inadequacies of legal remedies may arise
from the delay necessary to invoke them, or because the remedy itself cannot
20 The classic statement regarding this point is found in an old English case: "The
plaintiff might have such an immediate want of his goods, that an action of trover
would not do his business." Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915, 916, 93 Eng. Rep. 939.
See also: DeGraff v. County of Ramsy, 46 Minn. 319, 320, 48 N.W. 1135 (1891).
21 Cases aff'd.: Peterson v. O'Neill, 255 Ill. App. 400 (1930); Chicago & Eastern Ill.
Rwy. Co. v. Miller, 309 Ill. 257, 140 N.E. 823 (1923); City of Chicago v. N.W. Mutual
Ins. Co., 218 1I. 40, 75 N.E. 803 (1905); Pemberton v. Williams, 87 111. 15 (1877); Chicago
& Alton Rwy. Co. v. Chicago Vermilion & Wilmington Coal Co., 79 IlI. 121 (1875);
Spaids v. Barrett, 57 111. 289, 11 Am. Rep. 10 (1870); Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25 111.
349 (1861). Cases denying recovery but recognizing doctrine: Ill. Merchants' Trust Co.
v. Harvey, 335 I11. 284, 167 N.E. 69 (1929); Koenig v. The Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 153 Ill. App. 432 (1910); 111. Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 I1. 535, 85
N.E. 200 (1908); Elston v. City of Chicago, 40 I11. 514, 89 Am. Dec. 361 (1866).
22202 I1. App. 177 (1916).
23 Id. at 180.
24 Weinnian Pump Manufacturing Co. v. B. F. Cline, 183 N.E. 2d 465, 470 (Court of
Appcals, Ohio, 1961).
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accomplish the fulfillment of the right. Where the loss which may result from
the effort to legally enforce a right is substantially greater than the loss which
results from compliance with a wrongful demand, the will is surely overridden.
There is no freedom of choice; only a choice of evils. To deny recovery and
thereby upheld the extortion is to deny an effective protection for the con-
tractual rights, and to encourage the breach.25
By its decision in this case, the Ohio court not only went against the
weight of authority by not recognizing the doctrine of business compul-
sion, but it also is encouraging breach of contract under similar circum-
stances.
25 Id. at 472.
REAL PROPERTY-CONDEMNATION OF NON-SLUM
AREA FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
The plaintiffs, sixty-eight home owners, brought suit for a declaratory
judgement that, a section1 of the New York General Municipal Law, was
unconstitutional on its face and as it applied to a proposed redevelopment
project in an area in which the plaintiffs lived. The challenged section
authorizes cities to condemn, for the purpose of reclamation and redevel-
opment, predominantly vacant areas which are economically dead with
the result that their existence and condition impairs the sound growth of
the community. The section states that if one or more of the noted con-
ditions exist, 2 the planning commission, after public hearings, may desig-
nate the area as one requiring redevelopment and that the municipalities
may use the power of eminent domain, if necessary, to clear, replan, and
redevelop the vacant land. The question presented to the court was
whether this statute, which allows the condemnation of an area which is
substandard but does not contain tangible physical blight, is unconstitu-
tional because it allows a private use of condemned land which is not an
actual slum. In effect the statute allows the use of the power of eminent
domain for private industrial purposes. The court held that an area in a
city does not have to be a slum in order to make its redevelopment a pub-
' N.Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW AR'ncLE 15, S 72n.
2 Subdivision of the land into lots of such form, shape, or size as to be incapable of
effective development; obsolete and poorly designed street patterns with inadequate
access; unsuitable topographic or other physical conditions impeding the development
of appropriate uses; obsolete utilities; buildings unfit for use of occupancy as a result
of age, obsolescence, etc.; dangerous, unsanitary or improper uses and conditions ad-
versely affecting public health, safety, or welfare; scattered improvements which, be-
cause of their incompatibility with an appropriate pattern of land use and streets, retard
the development of the land. GErNERAL MuNICIPAL LMV ARTICLE 15 S 72n subd. 1, pars.
a and b.
